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ABSTRACT
In 2001, the California Supreme Court embarked upon a novel
experiment in its right of publicity jurisprudence. The court
imported a single element from copyright's fair use analysis. That
element—transformative use—has since become an enormously
important defense for publicity defendants. Unfortunately, the
transformative use doctrine is notoriously protean, and has resulted
in significant confusion in publicity law that almost certainly chills
protected speech. Many courts seem to lack a clear idea of what a
sophisticated transformative use analysis should even look like. This
article unpacks these issues and proposes improvements to this
difficult legal area.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2001, the California Supreme Court embarked upon a novel
experiment in its right of publicity jurisprudence. The right of
publicity, which grants celebrities and others the ability to control
certain uses of their identities, 1 had always had a contested
relationship with First Amendment free speech principles. By
allowing publicity plaintiffs to punish various uses of their personae,
the free expression of speakers who wished to celebrate, critique,
comment on, or remix celebrity identity 2 was unquestionably
threatened to some degree. Although there were a variety of extant
judicial doctrines designed to ameliorate this tension between
publicity rights and free expression, the California high court in
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup 3 chose to strike out into
uncharted doctrinal territory, importing from copyright law a single
element of copyright’s fair use analysis. This element,
transformative use, has since become an enormously important
defense for publicity defendants. Transformative use essentially
means that a borrower adds new insights or aesthetic variation when
borrowing expressive materials from others.4
But the transformative doctrine—plucked from copyright law
and deposited into the alien domain of right of publicity law—has
proven to be an ineffective carrier of First Amendment values. For
a variety of reasons, transformative use is not a particularly good fit
as a stand-in for free expression interests. But beyond this basic

1
JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE
FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 1 (2018).
2

RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED

Although right of publicity law is primarily the province of celebrities,
ordinary people can succeed in publicity suits as well in many jurisdictions.
3
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
4
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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problem of fit, the doctrine is notoriously protean.5 In fact, many
courts don’t seem to have a clear idea of what a transformative use
analysis should even look like, as this Article will demonstrate. As
noted I.P. commentator J. Thomas McCarthy put it, the
transformative test is “subjective in application, unpredictable in
outcome, and fraught with ambiguity. Difficulty of application and
incertitude of result are the hallmarks of the court’s ‘transformative’
test.”6 Unfortunately, this unpredictability can lead to an analysis
that is so slippery and sometimes arbitrary that speakers (and their
counsel) simply lack a clear idea of how the courts might treat their
particular appropriations in the event of litigation. This lack of
clarity, in turn, can produce chilling effects on what might otherwise
be protected speech.
This Article unpacks these issues and proposes possible
improvements to the transformative use doctrine. 7 First, we
chronicle the origins of transformative use analysis in copyright
doctrine. Next, we explore the California Supreme Court’s
importation of the transformative test from copyright into right of
publicity law. We then provide a taxonomy of the various modes of
transformative use that courts have adopted in publicity cases in the
wake of Comedy III. Finally, we offer suggestions for an improved
analysis in this difficult area of the law.

5

Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, The Jurisprudence of Transformation:
Intellectual Incoherence and Doctrinal Murkiness Twenty Years After Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 92 (2014).
6

J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 264
(2017).
7
Other works that have explored related aspects of right of publicity doctrine
include: Justin L. Rand, Case Comment: Transformative Use and the Right of
Publicity: A Relationship Ready for Revision, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
335 (2014-2015); Matthew R. Grothouse, Collateral Damage: Why the
Transformative Use Test Confounds Publicity Rights Law, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH.
474 (2014); Stacy L. Dogan & Mark Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can
Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (2006); F. Jay Dougherty,
All the World’s Not a Stooge: The “Transformativeness” Test for Analyzing a
First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a
Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2003); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903 (2003).
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I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAIR USE LAW
Although the origins of what became the transformative use
doctrine in copyright law go back some years, 8 the locus classicus
of the doctrine is a 1990 Harvard Law Review article by federal
judge and legal scholar Pierre N. Leval. 9 Judge Leval, who as of this
writing serves on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
sought in the article to provide a more precise grounding for fair use
doctrine. Fair use is designed to allow individuals to borrow some
unspecified amount of copyrighted expression without permission
or payment under certain circumstances. 10 As one commentator put
it, fair use “is an important safety valve that acts as a bulwark against
the monopoly power that inheres in an exclusive right [for copyright
owners] and which leads owners of such rights to act in ways
contrary to the public interest.”11
Leval’s approach was driven by the uncertainty that he claimed
inhered in the fair use caselaw of the time. Although the fair use
statute,12 part of the federal Copyright Act, already contained a fourpart test for determining whether a particular use was fair (including
such factors as how much of the work the borrower appropriated and
whether the borrower’s work affected the market value of the
original), Leval was concerned that fair use decisions by courts were
wildly inconsistent. “Earlier decisions provide little basis for
predicting later ones,” Leval wrote. “Reversals and divided courts
are commonplace. . . . Decisions are not governed by consistent
principles, but seem rather to result from intuitive reactions to
individual fact patterns.”13
To repair this Babelian state of affairs, Leval proposed that fair
use analysis should be aligned with the central purpose of copyright
8

Prior to the creation of the transformative use rubric, courts had at times
applied a doctrine of “productive use” that had some similar properties. See Laura
G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use
Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677 (1995).
9
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105
(1990).
10
See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE (2011).
11
Id. at 6.
12
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
13
Leval, supra note 9, at 1106-1107.
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law itself, which was to incentivize authors to create original works
that stimulated artistic and intellectual progress. 14 The same concern
for progress that was the underpinning of copyright writ large should
drive fair use analysis as well—successful fair users should, Leval
wrote, engage in transformative uses of the material they
appropriated rather than simply engaging in verbatim borrowing.
Leval argued that:
[i]f . . . the secondary use adds value to the original—if the
quoted material is used as raw material, transformed in the
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights or
understandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair
use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of
society.15
Leval’s proposed transformative use analysis was, with
surprising alacrity, adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court in 1993’s
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.16 The dispute in Campbell arose
when rap group 2 Live Crew borrowed a few musical and lyrical
elements from the popular Roy Orbison hit song, “Oh, Pretty
Woman,” and created a crude rap parody that quickly drew a
copyright infringement suit from the song’s publisher.17 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that the rappers’
commercial purpose in creating the parody weighed against a
finding of fair use, but a unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Justice David Souter, reversed.18
Justice Souter acknowledged that commercial use by a putative
fair user had at times been regarded as a black mark under the
“purpose and character of the use” factor from the statute. 19
However, following Judge Leval, the Court reasoned that the
14

Id. at 1110; See U.S. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to
pass copyright and patent statutes “To promote the Progress of Science and the
useful arts . . .”).
15
Leval, supra note 10, at 1111.
16
510 U.S. 569 (1994).
17
Id. at 573.
18
Id. at 594.
19
Id. at 583-584.
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inquiry should instead focus on whether the borrowing work was
transformative, that is, whether it added “something new with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message.” 20 This “new expression,
meaning or message” formulation was the heart of the Court’s
explication of the nascent doctrine of transformative use. Although
there was reasonable evidence to conclude that 2 Live Crew’s use
of “Oh, Pretty Woman” indeed met this standard, the Court declined
to so find. Rather the Court remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit
with the tepid observation that “it is fair to say that 2 Live Crew’s
song reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original,
or criticizing it, to some degree.” 21
Notably, 2 Live Crew did not alter the relatively small amount
of musical and lyrical materials borrowed from the original song.
Instead, the rappers reproduced those items verbatim and added
various other elements to the mix that the Court ultimately suggested
might be transformative, since the entire work, rife with crude
sexual references, seemed to critique or comment on the innocent
naivete of the original song.22
In the wake of Campbell, and with no further guidance from the
high court, lower federal courts created an assortment of differing
conceptions of transformative use, some of which contradicted each
other.23 One model, dubbed “new insights,” seemed to require that
the borrowing work provide some comment on or critique of the
original work 24 —absent that connection, the use was not
transformative. Another conception, “creative metamorphosis,”
required no connection between the borrowing work and the
original, but simply asked whether sufficient aesthetic variation
(however that might be operationalized) could be observed when
comparing the borrowing work to the original. 25 If so, the use was
20

Id. at 573.
Id. at 583.
22
Id. at 581-582.
23
For further explanation and development of the three models, see Bunker
& Calvert, supra note 5, 102-125.
24
See, e.g., Liebovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir.
1998).
25
See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
21
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transformative. The borrowing work did not need to evince any link
to the original in any particular way, or even at all. A third strand,
the “new purpose” approach, found that even verbatim borrowings
could be labeled transformative, as long as the borrowing work was
employed for a different purpose or function than the original. 26 For
example, this “new purpose” conception could support as
transformative a borrower taking a work that was created for
marketing purposes and reproducing it, unaltered, for use in a news
or information context.27
As these differing conceptions of transformative use were being
refined in copyright law, courts also began applying the doctrine in
right of publicity cases. It is to that act of judicial appropriation that
we now turn.
II. TRANSFORMATIVE USE COLONIZES PUBLICITY DOCTRINE
In 2001, the California Supreme Court for the first time imported
transformative use analysis into a tort case sounding in right of
publicity law. The state high court’s opinion in Comedy III
Productions v. Saderup, 28 while not particularly convincing at a
theoretical level, soon led to other courts following suit. 29 Comedy
III arose when Saderup created a drawing, reproduced and sold on
t-shirts and lithographs, of The Three Stooges, an iconic comedy
ensemble. The entity entrusted with licensing for the Stooges then
filed suit, alleging a publicity violation.30
On appeal, the California Supreme Court recognized that
Saderup’s likeness of the Stooges was an expressive work eligible
for First Amendment protection, even though it was created and
marketed for commercial gain. 31 The court also recognized that
expressive uses of celebrity identity often serve important First
Amendment purposes: “[b]ecause celebrities take on public
meaning, the appropriation of their likenesses may have important
26

See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).
See, e.g., Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000).
28
21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
29
See cases cited and discussed in remaining sections of this Article.
30
Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797 at 800.
31
Id. at 802.
27
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uses in uninhibited debate about public issues, particularly debates
about culture and values.” 32 Nonetheless, the court reasoned, all
expressive works are not insulated from the reach of the publicity
tort. 33 In striking a balance between publicity rights and First
Amendment free expression interests, the California Supreme Court
pointed out that other courts had produced a variety of tests, none of
which the court found sufficient. 34 Noting that some academic
commentators had proposed borrowing the fair use standard from
copyright law, the state high court reasoned that the entire fair use
test was not a good fit in publicity cases, but that one element,
transformative use, was the appropriate inquiry. 35 The court,
drawing from Campbell, found the appropriate test to be whether
“the work in question adds something new, with a further purpose
or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message.”36
Applying its new First Amendment standard, the court ruled that
a straightforward, accurate rendition of a plaintiff’s persona, as
Saderup had produced, was not transformative and thus not
protected against a right of publicity claim. 37 However, when the
defendant creates a transformative use involving the plaintiff’s
identity, that additional expressive content strengthens the First
Amendment interests involved.38 In addition, the transformative use
of a persona is “less likely to interfere with the economic interest
protected by the right of publicity.” 39 The court restated the
transformativeness test as “whether the celebrity likeness is one of
the ‘raw materials’ from which the original work is synthesized, or
whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum
and substance of the work in question.”40
32

Id. at 803.
Id. at 804-805.
34
For a survey of some of these tests, see, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717
F.3d 141, 153-161 (3d Cir. 2013).
35
Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797 at 807-08.
36
Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
37
Id. at 811.
38
Id. at 808.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 809.
33
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The Comedy III court also provided a “subsidiary inquiry” that
asked whether the marketability of the work in question derived
primarily from the plaintiff’s fame or from the creativity and
reputation of the defendant.41 In the latter case, the First Amendment
should protect the work.
Several points are worth noting from Comedy III. First, unlike
fair use in copyright, which is a statutory limit on the exclusive
rights of copyright holders, the Comedy III court was employing the
transformative use doctrine as a constitutional First Amendment
standard. This was not the purpose for which Judge Leval had
synthesized the doctrine, nor the use to which it was put by the Court
in Campbell. Second, by declining to consider the other parts of the
copyright fair use analysis, the California Supreme Court had
plucked a single element from that complex, multi-factor
determination and installed it as the exclusive route to First
Amendment protection for right of publicity defendants. In
copyright law, the Campbell Court had made clear, the absence of a
transformative use was not the death knell of a fair use claim. In the
Comedy III publicity regime, First Amendment protection rose or
fell based on that factor alone. Rather than an incremental
development in standard legal doctrine, as the opinion seemed to
imply, Comedy III was in fact a radical and undertheorized departure
from traditional First Amendment analysis.
III. IDENTIFYING THE LOCUS OF TRANSFORMATION
After Comedy III, Courts both inside and outside of California,
including influential federal courts, 42 began applying the
transformative use test in publicity cases. However, the test appears
to mean different things to different courts. One of the key divisions
is on the question of the required locus of any transformative
changes wrought by the defendant. In other words, must the
defendant transform the borrowed persona itself or can it claim a
transformative use if it places the unaltered persona into a work that,
as a whole, has transformative elements? To shed more light on this,
consider transformative doctrine as applied in the Campbell case in
41
42

Id. at 810.
E.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Co., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
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the copyright context. 2 Live Crew did not transform the borrowed
materials from “Oh, Pretty Woman.” Instead, the rappers
appropriated verbatim musical phrases and lyrics from the song and
surrounded those with other expressive elements that resulted in an
entirely new work. That is often how transformative use is applied
in copyright doctrine—the defendant need not engage in creative
metamorphosis with the borrowed materials themselves, but can
instead place the unaltered, appropriated elements into the context
of a new work that, as a whole, offers new meaning, message, or
expression.
Interestingly, and perhaps unfortunately, Comedy III itself did
not address this question since the facts of the case did not offer any
opportunity to do so. The Comedy III court did not make entirely
clear exactly where the requisite transformation needed to occur—
did the celebrity persona itself need to be transformed, or could the
celebrity persona, unaltered, be situated in the context of a larger
transformative work and still be protected? This confusion was
somewhat understandable, since the personae of the Stooges was in
fact the entirety of the work in Comedy III—the “work” consisted
solely of the likenesses of The Three Stooges on t-shirts and
lithographs. Thus, there was no occasion to consider a contextual
transformative work in which the persona was reproduced
unchanged within a work that featured other transformative
elements. Nonetheless, there is language in Comedy III that suggests
that an appropriation can be transformative without performing any
alteration on the persona itself. At one point, the court, in elaborating
its distinction between the persona being one of the “raw materials”
of the defendant’s work versus the “sum and substance” of the work,
states that “we ask . . . whether a product containing a celebrity’s
likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness. And
when we use the word ‘expression,’ we mean expression of
something other than the likeness of the celebrity.”43
Later publicity cases applying the transformative doctrine
appear to have split into at least three camps. This paper refers to the
approach requiring alteration of the persona itself as “atomistic”
43

Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797 at 809.
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decisions, and the approach allowing broader contextual
transformation as “holistic” decisions. 44 As well, other courts have
focused primarily on the quantity of the taking in relation to the
defendant’s work, without significant attention to the amount the
second work transforms the persona. 45
IV. ATOMISTIC APPROACHES TO TRANSFORMATION
A clear example of the atomistic approach is found in the Third
Circuit case Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 46 in which a majority
found the appropriation to be non-transformative. Hart arose after
video game company Electronic Arts used elements of college
football players’ personae in its NCAA Football game series.47 Ryan
Hart, a quarterback for the Rutgers University football team,
objected to the creation of virtual players (avatars) that resembled
real-life college football players and shared playing stats and
biographical details with their real-life counterparts. 48 After a
federal district court granted summary judgment to EA on First
Amendment grounds, the Third Circuit reversed.
In reviewing the lower court decision, the Third Circuit majority
was clear that video games are entitled to First Amendment
protection as expressive works.49 Nonetheless, that protection was
not unlimited when in conflict with other competing interests,
including the right of publicity. The majority then canvassed judicial
44

See cases cited and discussed in Parts IV and V, infra.
See cases cited and discussed in Part VI, infra.
46
717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied 573 U.S. 989 (2014). Alongside
Hart, an almost identical analysis of a nearly identical fact pattern can be found
in Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). The two cases are
strikingly similar in that both feature a two-judge majority applying an atomistic
approach, with a single dissenting judge urging a broader and more contextual
consideration of transformativeness. Other largely atomistic court decisions
include Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2015); Mine O’ Mine,
Inc. v. Calmese, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75236 (D. Nev. 2011); Diller v. Barry
Driller, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133515 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Mitchell v. Cartoon
Network, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157737 (D. N.J. 2015).
47
Hart, 717 F.3d at 146.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 147 (citing Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 U.S. 2729, 2733
(2011)).
45
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tests designed to balance free expression interests against the right
of publicity, including “the commercial-interest-based Predominant
Use Test, the trademark-based Rogers test, and the copyright-based
Transformative Use Test,” 50 ultimately concluding that the latter
was the court’s preferred mode of analysis.
In applying the transformative test, the majority focused almost
exclusively on whether EA transformed Hart’s persona itself. As the
court put it, “we must determine whether [Hart’s] identity is
sufficiently transformed in NCAA Football.”51 This singular focus
on the persona itself led the majority to reason that because the
digital avatar closely resembled Hart, and because the biographical
and statistical information on Hart was accurate, there was nothing
transformative about EA’s use of those items. 52 The majority did
briefly consider the world into which the avatar was placed, but
found insufficient transformation since the context was a digitally
recreated football game, the very same activity the real-life Hart
gained fame in pursuing.
The majority also rejected EA’s argument that an interactive
feature that allowed users to alter the appearances of the avatars was
sufficiently transformative. Such a finding would open the door to
“cynical abuse,” the court reasoned, since “video game companies
could commit the most blatant acts of misappropriation only to
absolve themselves by including a feature that allows users to
modify the digital likenesses.” 53 The Third Circuit also rejected
EA’s claim that other creative features of the game amounted to a
transformative use, since those features, “do not affect Appellant’s
digital avatar.”54 The majority’s analysis here is roughly equivalent
to the “new insights” paradigm in copyright fair use cases, in which,
to be transformative, the borrower must comment on or in some way
offer new understandings of the borrowed expression. 55 In other
words, the creative context into which the borrowed material is
placed must interact with or operate upon it sufficiently to affect the
reader or viewers’ perception of the borrowed expression.
50

717 F.3d at 153.
Id. at 165.
52
Id. at 167.
53
Id. at 167
54
Id. at 169.
55
See note 24 and related text, supra.
51
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Although the Hart court did make a brief, half-hearted detour
into contextual aspects of the game, its analysis is overwhelmingly
atomistic. Transformation must occur, if at all, in the use of the
persona itself, or, possibly, in other expressive features of the work
that have a significant impact on the persona. In dissent, Judge
Thomas L. Ambro objected that “[his] colleagues limit effectively
the transformative inquiry to Hart’s identity alone, disregarding
other features of the work.” 56 Judge Ambro pointed out that this
approach penalized realistic depictions of actual persons that were
routinely protected in other media. 57 The dissent also made clear
that this methodology is inconsistent with the one advocated for by
the California Supreme Court in Comedy III and later cases. Instead
of the majority’s cramped approach, Ambro reasoned, “we must
examine the creative work in the aggregate to determine whether it
satisfies the Transformative Use Test and merits First Amendment
protection.”58
In his own analysis, Judge Ambro found that not only did EA’s
video game offer “myriad original graphics, videos, sound effects,”
and the like, but it also allowed players to create game scenarios in
which players who had never competed against each other in real
life competed in the virtual world of the game. 59 Moreover, certain
game modes allowed game players to direct multiple seasons of play
with unique virtual player combinations. “Such modes of interactive
play,” Ambro wrote, “are imaginative transformations of the games
played by real players.”60
The atomistic approach seems misguided in light of the
transformative use doctrine’s origin. In copyright law, no court
requires the borrowed portion of plaintiff’s expression be altered in
some way to produce a transformative use. Rather, the expectation
is that unaltered borrowed materials will be combined into to a larger
work that is itself transformative. 61 The atomistic approach in
56

Id. at 171 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
Id. at 173 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
58
Id. at 172 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
59
Id. at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
60
Id. at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
61
See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (appropriation
artist’s use of defendant’s photographs was transformative since the defendant’s
57
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publicity cases completely ignores the creative work of the
defendant if the persona itself is not transmogrified in some fashion.
The approach is also at odds with language in Comedy III suggesting
that if the persona is one of the raw materials in the creation of a
larger expressive work, the use is therefore transformative.62
V. HOLISTIC APPROACHES TO TRANSFORMATION
A holistic approach to the transformative inquiry is found in a
2013 California court of appeals decision, Ross v. Roberts. 63 In
Ross, defendant, a rapper, appropriated the name and persona of a
celebrated drug dealer, Rick Ross. Ross had achieved notoriety as a
high-volume cocaine distributer in the 1980s. The defendant,
William Leonard Roberts II, was apparently inspired by Ross’
felonious exploits and began a career as a rapper under the name
Rick Ross. Some of Roberts’ songs bragged about cocaine
trafficking and other illicit deeds. When the real Rick Ross learned
about Roberts’ appropriation of his name and persona, he
commenced a lawsuit alleging violation of his right of publicity and
related claims.
On the question of transformative use, the California appellate
work, as a whole, was quite different in character from plaintiff’s work).
62
This point was seemingly reinforced in Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473
(Cal. 2003), although the case is not entirely clear since it did in fact involve
significant alterations to the personae of the plaintiffs, rock musicians Johnny and
Edgar Winter, who were presented as evil half-human, half-worm characters in a
comic book. Nonetheless, the court alluded to a holistic view when it pointed out
that “plaintiffs are merely part of the raw materials from which the comic books
were synthesized [and were contained in] a larger story, which is itself quite
expressive.” Id. at 479. The latter statement seems to suggest that more than just
changes in a plaintiff’s persona are salient in the transformative determination.
For another primarily atomistic analysis that nonetheless gestured in the direction
of holism, see No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018
(Cal. Ct. App. 2d Div. 2011).
63
Ross v. Roberts, 222 Cal. App. 677 (Ca. Ct. App., 2013). In addition to the
holistic cases discussed in the text, see, e.g., Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d
894 (9th Cir. 2010); Daniels v. Wayans, 8 Cal. App. 5th 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017);
Washington v. Take-Two Interactive Software, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
7975 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Bosley v. WildWetT.com, 310 F.Supp.2d 924 (N.D.
Ohio 2004).
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court had little difficulty concluding that the use was transformative,
even though the plaintiff’s name was taken verbatim. Citing Comedy
III, the court reasoned that even though the defendant adopted the
name “Rick Ross” and wrote songs about cocaine trafficking, these
elements were merely the “’raw material’ from which Roberts’
music career was synthesized.64 But these are not the ‘very sum and
substance’ of Roberts’ work.”65
Rather than focus on the verbatim taking of the plaintiff’s name,
as an atomistic court might, the court examined the
rapper/defendant’s entire oeuvre and determined that the artistic
universe into which the name and persona of Ross had been
transported was highly transformative, since it added new
expression to the plaintiff’s story. “Using the name and certain
details of an infamous criminal’s life as its basic elements, he
created original artistic works,” the court wrote. 66
Critically, the Ross court was not fixated on whether the
appropriated materials themselves were altered, as was the court in
Hart. The Ross court looked beyond the borrowed material itself and
asked whether the entire work (or works) into which the borrowed
material is placed add “new expression, meaning, or message” as a
whole. Accordingly, the use was transformative and thus protected
by the First Amendment.
The Ross court also briefly explored the “subsidiary inquiry”
from Comedy III that asks whether the economic value of the
defendant’s work is primarily derived from the plaintiff’s fame.67
The court answered this question in the defendant’s favor as well,
reasoning that “when individuals purchase music, they generally do
so in order to listen to music that they enjoy. It defies credibility to
suggest that Roberts gained success primarily from appropriation of
plaintiff’s name and identity, instead of from the music and
professional persona that he (and other defendants) created.” 68 It’s
worth noting that this analysis is also holistic in that it focuses on
the overall rationale for plaintiff’s success, rather than the simple
64

Ross v. Roberts, 222 Cal. App. 677 at 688.
Id. at 687 (quoting Comedy III (citations omitted)).
66
Id. at 687-88.
67
Id. at 688.
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Id. at 688.
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fact that he appropriated another’s persona and may as a result have
gotten some initial attention from the public.
Another strongly holistic opinion is the Sixth Circuit’s 2003
decision in favor of an artist who painted Tiger Woods in ETW Corp.
v. Jireh Publ’g Inc. 69 In ETW Corp., sports artist Rick Rush had
painted a work titled “The Masters of Augusta” commemorating
Woods’ remarkable win at the 1997 Masters Tournament. 70 In
addition to Woods’ record 12-stroke victory, the win at the
previously exclusionary tournament by a golfer of color was also
considered a landmark. Rush’s painting featured three standard
images of Woods going about his business on the course, with a
ghostly pantheon of golf demigods, including Arnold Palmer,
Bobby Jones, and others, looking on. 71 ETW, the corporate arm of
Woods’ empire, filed suit alleging right of publicity violations,
trademark infringement, and other related claims.
The court applied various tests to the publicity claim, but the
transformative analysis is particularly interesting for purposes of
this paper. The Sixth Circuit majority ruled that despite the unaltered
depiction of Woods, the entirety of the painting was
transformative. 72 “Rush’s work does not capitalize solely on a
literal depiction of Woods,” the court reasoned. 73 “Rather, Rush’s
work consists of a collage of images in addition to Woods’s image
which are combined to describe, in artistic form, a historic event in
sports history and to convey a message about the significance of
Woods’s achievement.” 74 The court thus concluded that the
“substantial transformative elements” 75 involved in the painting
meant that the work was protected by the First Amendment.
The Sixth Circuit’s approach in ETW Corp. is unquestionably a
holistic one, since the court paid little attention to the fact that the
Woods’ likeness was unaltered and focused exclusively on the
transformativeness of entire expressive work.
69

ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Co., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 918.
71
Id.
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Id. at 938.
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VI. THE DE MINIMIS MODEL
One 2018 California publicity case seemed to focus less on
transformative use as some sort of aesthetic reconfiguration (either
of the persona or of the larger work) and more on the quantitatively
minor role the plaintiff’s persona played in the entire work. In De
Havilland v. FX Networks LLC,76 screen legend Olivia de Havilland
objected to a television miniseries, Feud: Bette and Joan. The
production, which was centered on the enmity between actresses
Joan Crawford and Bette Davis, included Catherine Zeta-Jones
portraying de Havilland. 77 As the court of appeals noted, the de
Havilland character was featured for fewer than 17 minutes of the
entire series’ 392-minute run.78 De Havilland was portrayed giving
an interview in which she discusses Hollywood’s treatment of
women and in a segment interacting with Bette Davis.79 As the court
pointed out, de Havilland was portrayed positively as “beautiful,
glamorous, self-assured, and considerably ahead of her time in her
views on the importance of equality and respect for women in
Hollywood.”80
Nonetheless, the real de Havilland was unhappy with the
portrayal, including one scene in which the de Havilland character
refers to her sister as a “bitch.”81 De Havilland brought a variety of
privacy-related claims, including one for violation of California’s
statutory right of publicity. In the trial court, FX filed a motion to
strike under California’s anti-SLAPP law, which the trial court
denied.82
On appeal, the court of appeals made short work of the publicity
claim, since it found the docudrama to be fully protected by the First
Amendment against the right of publicity claim. 83 The court
76

De Havilland v. FX Networks LLC, 21 Cal. App. 5th 845 (Ca. Ct. App.,.
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Id. at 850.
Id. at 851.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Feud: Betty and Joan (FX television broadcast March 5, 2017).
82
De Havilland, 21 Cal. App. 5th at 851.
83
Id. at 861-862.
78

2019]

TRANSFORMATIVE VARIATIONS

155

nonetheless also engaged in a transformativeness analysis, which
appeared to be a kind of alternative holding on the publicity
question.84
The trial court had ruled that a docudrama that attempted to
make its characters as close to reality as possible could not be
transformative. 85 The appellate court disagreed, pointing out that
“the fictitious, ‘imagined’ interview in which Zeta-Jones talks about
the Hollywood’s treatment of women and the Crawford/Davis
rivalry is a far cry from T-shirts depicting a representational,
pedestrian, uncreative drawing of The Three Stooges.” 86 Moreover,
the court focused on the fact that the de Havilland role merely
amounted to around 4 percent of Feud.87 The docudrama told many
stories that had no connection to de Havilland, the court reasoned,
and the de Havilland story arc was but a tiny segment of the entire
work.88 The appeals court also cited the “subsidiary inquiry’’ from
Comedy III and found that the marketability and economic value of
Feud was derived mainly from the skill and reputation of its creative
team and not from de Havilland’s fame.89
Interestingly, the overall transformativeness determination
focused very little on any creative use of the plaintiff’s persona,
either atomistically or holistically. Instead, it sounds as if the court
is applying a sort of de minimis analysis.90 The court’s approach also
bears a resemblance to the “amount and substantiality of the portion
used” factor from copyright’s fair use provision, although here the
California court inverted it by focusing not on the proportion used
in relation to the size of the plaintiff’s work (as in copyright), but on
the proportion of the persona used in relation to the size of the
defendant’s work.91
De Havilland is thus something of an outlier in the existing
opinions that apply transformative use analysis. It certainly bases its
84
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Id. at 863.
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For a useful look at the de minimis doctrine in copyright law, see Julie D.
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analysis on the Comedy III subsidiary test about the “marketability
and economic value” of the work, but it engages in almost no
attention to any actual transformation by the defendant. Instead, it
focuses heavily on the quantitative dimension of the persona’s
appearance in the entire work. Had the Hart court adopted a similar
analysis, it seems entirely possible that Ryan Hart’s persona was
deployed in a tiny percentage of the all virtual games played by
NCAA Football fans. Thus, under this kind of approach, EA might
have succeeded in demonstrating a transformative use, since it the
collection of all the avatars that made the game valuable to players.
Any one player was insignificant in this sense.
Is the quasi de minimis style of analysis employed in De
Havilland even something that can be characterized as a
“transformative use” inquiry? It certainly bears no resemblance to
the transformative concept as deployed in copyright doctrine. It has
the virtue of permitting realistic portrayals of human identity to be
treated as transformative—something the atomistic approach
eschews. At least two other cases have relied heavily on this analytic
approach.92
VII. SIDESTEPPING THE TRANSFORMATIVE TEST
At least one recent case, decided by the Ninth Circuit in 2016,
managed to avoid applying the transformative test entirely. In
Sarver v. Chartier, 93 the Ninth Circuit considered an army
sergeant’s claim that the makers of the Oscar-winning film The Hurt
Locker violated his right of publicity in creating the film’s main
character, an Army bomb disposal technician in Iraq. The film’s
screenwriter had previously written a profile of Sarver that appeared
92

Arenas v. Shed Media, 881 F.Supp.2d 1181, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(writing that references to professional basketball player in television show were
“incidental to the show’s plot as a whole.”); Noriega v. Activision Blizzard, BC
551747, L.A. County Superior Court at p. 5 (Oct. 27, 2014) (writing that the video
game in question was, as a whole, “complex and multi-faceted” and only used the
persona of deposed Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega in a de minimis
fashion, thus making his persona one of the “raw materials” of the game, but not
its
“sum
and
substance.”),
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in a national publication, and Sarver claimed that the film’s main
character was based upon his life and experiences. 94
The Ninth Circuit, on an anti-SLAPP motion, rejected Sarver’s
publicity claim not by applying the transformative test, but by
deploying a much more potent constitutional standard—First
Amendment strict scrutiny. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis 95 stated
that it had upheld publicity claims against First Amendment
challenges in situations in which a defendant “appropriates the
economic value that the plaintiff has built in an identity or
performance.”96 As one example of this type of case, the court noted
that in Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc. 97 , (discussed earlier in this
work in connection with the Hart case) it had upheld the right of a
college football player to recover for use of his likeness in EA’s
video game. A second line of cases in which publicity rights had
trumped free speech rights, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, involved use
of plaintiffs’ personae in advertisements, since commercial speech
is a less-protected category of expression. “In sum,” the court stated,
“our precedents have held that speech which either appropriates the
economic value of a performance or persona or seeks to capitalize
off a celebrity’s image in commercial advertisements is unprotected
by the First Amendment against a California right-of-publicity
claim.”98
The Ninth Circuit panel reasoned that Sarver’s claim did not fit
either of those categories. First, The Hurt Locker was not
commercial speech, but rather a fully protected expressive work. 99
Moreover, unlike plaintiffs in cases such as Keller, Sarver did not
“invest time and money to build up economic value in a marketable
94

Id. at 896.
The Ninth Circuit panel devoted significant discussion to Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the U.S. Supreme
Court’s sole intervention into the First Amendment status of right of publicity
doctrine. Zacchini is regarded by some commentators as sui generis, since it
involved a complete appropriation of the plaintiff’s 15-second act, rather than
being a more standard publicity claim involving name or likeness. Thus, its
precedential force in a run-of-the-mill right of publicity suit may be limited.
96
Sarver, 813 F.3d at 904.
97
724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
98
Sarver, 813 F.3d at 905.
99
Id. at 906.
95

158
14:2

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[VOL.

performance or identity. Rather, Sarver is a private person who lived
his life and worked his job.”100 Thus, there was no appropriation of
economic value or free-riding on Sarver’s public persona, since he
had never even attempted to create one. As a result, in Sarver’s case,
the right of publicity was appropriately categorized as a contentbased restriction on fully protected speech, which therefore required
strict scrutiny. 101 As is generally the case when strict scrutiny is
deployed, 102 the Ninth Circuit found that Sarver could not
demonstrate a compelling interest in penalizing the speech of the
defendant filmmakers.103 Thus, his right of publicity claim failed.
Sarver may be the only reported federal circuit case in which
strict scrutiny was applied to a right of publicity claim. The
application of strict scrutiny did indeed avoid the need for a
transformative analysis, although the uses of strict scrutiny were
nonetheless sharply circumscribed by the Ninth Circuit panel. In
cases in which a plaintiff worked in some way to create an
economically valuable persona or performance, or where the use
involved commercial speech, strict scrutiny would not apply under
the Sarver formulation. Oddly, Sarver barely mentioned the
transformative test, instead characterizing Keller not as a case in
which the use was nontransformative, but as simply a case in which
the use was unprotected by the First Amendment. In a footnote, the
Sarver court noted that a transformative use test was “an affirmative
defense formulated by the California Supreme Court which aims to
strike a balance between First Amendment interests and a plaintiff’s
asserted right of publicity. We need not and do not reach the
question of whether such defense applies in this case.” 104
Does this indicate that the Ninth Circuit is moving away from
100

Id. at 905.
The Ninth Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s controversial recent decision
in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), a case in which Justice
Clarence Thomas’s majority opinion seemingly expanded the concept of contentbased restrictions on speech, which, however defined, have long been subject to
strict scrutiny review. See Minch Minchin, A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality
in a Post-Reed Landscape, 22 COMM. L. & POL’Y 123 (2017).
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Comedy III’s transformative test? As a federal court sitting in a
diversity case, the Ninth Circuit is bound to apply the substantive
law of the state in which the district court sits (although the federal
constitution of course remains supreme). The Ninth Circuit did this
when it applied California’s anti-SLAPP statute. However, the
transformative use doctrine was relegated to a footnote. This may
call into question the legal status of transformative use, since the
Comedy III court seemed to present it as not merely a creature of
state law, but as a rule of constitutional dimension to sort out
conflicts between the First Amendment and the right of publicity. In
copyright’s version of fair use (of which the transformative doctrine
is a key aspect), fair use serves as a statutory proxy for free speech
interests that obviates the need for the application of the First
Amendment scrutiny structure, including strict scrutiny. 105
However, Sarver suggests that, whatever the juridical status of
transformative use in publicity law, it does not similarly substitute
for First Amendment scrutiny, at least in cases not involving
commercial speech or an economically valuable persona. Thus, by
almost completely ignoring the transformative test, Sarver places its
status in some doubt.
At least one commentator has attributed the strict scrutiny
approach in Sarver to the sweeping language of the Supreme Court’s
Reed case. 106 Professor Genevieve Lakier cited Sarver as one
example of “Reed’s effects across the country, as courts apply strict
scrutiny to—and strike down—laws that previously were, or likely
would have been, upheld as content-neutral prior to Reed.”107
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The state of the law at the intersection of the First Amendment
and the right of publicity is in considerable disarray. Not all courts
accept the transformative use test, but among those that do, very
different conceptions of transformation drive the case law. The
105
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atomistic analysis seems the least defensible, since that approach all
but rules out realistic portrayals of human identity. The more holistic
analysis is certainly a step in the right direction. At least under the
holistic model, which is more consistent with transformative use as
applied in copyright doctrine, defendants can point to a variety of
expressive efforts in their works to justify their appropriations rather
than engage in a forced and perhaps artificial alteration of the
plaintiff’s persona itself in order to find protection under the First
Amendment.
On the other hand, the de minimis version of transformative use,
while still very much a minority position, has some potential in a
certain class of cases. One advantage of this version is that courts
are not forced to make artistic judgments about the worth of the
transformative effort put in by the defendant. Instead, a more
quantitative judgment can be made based on how much of the new
work consists of the disputed persona. For a work like the one in De
Havilland, a lengthy television series, it may not be that difficult for
a potential defendant to meet the test, since many story arcs can take
place that don’t necessarily involve the plaintiff. On the other hand,
the de minimis model may be more difficult to operationalize if
employed in the case something less than a sprawling epic—say, a
painting or a photograph—works without vast expanses of narrative
space. Even in the setting of a film, how would a filmmaker create
a work that focused one particular individual (such as a biopic)
without having that individual’s persona occupy a great deal of the
narrative real estate? As a version of Comedy III’s “subsidiary
inquiry” it may have its uses, but it certainly could not successfully
subsume the transformative inquiry as a whole.
From a free expression perspective, Sarver represents the most
radical approach—jettisoning the transformative use doctrine in
favor of First Amendment strict scrutiny. The Sarver court, of
course, limited the application of strict scrutiny to cases involving
essentially unknown plaintiffs in which the persona wasn’t being
used in a commercial speech context. The latter stipulation makes
constitutional sense, since strict scrutiny is routinely applied only to
fully protected speech. However, the notion that strict scrutiny
should only be applied in the case of purely private figures and not
deployed in cases in which celebrity plaintiffs seek to punish makers
of expressive works seems odd. If anything, the First Amendment
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interest in depictions of the famous and powerful in expressive
works would be higher rather than lower. As one appellate brief
expressed this principle:
Indeed, the more important or famous a person is, the more
imperative that the First Amendment protects the right of
others to tell her story, including the right to assess and
criticize her free from the threat of litigation. The First
Amendment means nothing if it does not protect the rights
of artists to create controversial, even unflattering, works
about our leaders and celebrities.108
The Sarver approach essentially reverses the First Amendment
hierarchy established in cases such as New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan109 in which public official and public figure plaintiffs are
subject to a higher First Amendment burden than are private figures.
Of course, Sullivan was a defamation case, which features different
interests on the plaintiff’s side of the equation than the right of
publicity, but the inherent value of the defendant’s speech under the
First Amendment seems quite similar in either scenario.
Transformative use analysis has proven problematic in publicity
law. Because important expressive rights are at stake, it is
imperative that courts take steps to improve and clarify the doctrine,
most effectively by emphasizing the holistic approach described
here. Giving more attention to free expression interests that intersect
with publicity law is a critical step toward improved doctrine in this
area.
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